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Abstract Most studies that have investigated the relationship between governance and
performance of banks were interested in the developed countries and to a lesser extent,
the emerging countries. In this study, we tried to look from an empirical perspective, at
the impact of governance through some internal mechanisms, on the performance of
banks in a developing country like Tunisia. According to Kolsi and Ghorbel (2011), the
effect of governance on the financial and stock market performance is still unknown.
This result goes in the same direction as that of Adjaoud et al. (journal compilation 15,
2007), leading to the lack of connection between governance and traditional perfor-
mance measures. The empirical analysis is performed on a sample of eight Tunisian
commercial banks listed on the Stock Exchange over the period 2000–2011; we can
conclude that there is no standard governance structure and that each bank should adopt
the appropriate governance structure to improve the performance of the financial
market, in general, and the banking market, in particular. The verification of this central
assumption in the Tunisian context, therefore, is the fundamental contribution of this
study. It is for this reason that the results we, even modest, have achieved allow
enriching the issue of the impact of some governance variables varying according to
the chosen performance measurement, which is a neglected theme in the Tunisian
context.
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Introduction
The appearance of the theme of governance is assigned to the debate opened by Berle
and Means (1932) who were executed after the 1929 crisis. The problem of governance
for these two authors was born from the division of the property function into two
functions: an adjudicative one and a control one. This quarter, due to a failure of the
control systems which are responsible for key management discipline, would have
caused deterioration in the performance and counting of shareholders. The problem of
governance is thus part of a mind control officers.
In this due, financial institutions, mainly banks, are especially concerned with
corporate governance. In fact, banks are characterized by distinct agency problems
and are relatively supported as other nonregulated businesses. These agency problems
are created mainly by the asymmetry of existing information between all stakeholders
in the banking sector.
Previous researches are multiplied to give the determinants of an effective gover-
nance system. André and Schiehll (2004) argue that the literature reveals an association
between the governance systems and business performance, but empirical research on
this association did not provide conclusive results. In short, the different results show
that the impact of governance mechanisms on performance remains an empirical
question to explore. The ambiguity, both theoretical and empirical, prompted us to
clarify this association for the Tunisian case.
Thus, our problem is to what extent the governance is important in achieving
performance for banks in a developing country like Tunisia. The structure of this article
is as follows: the first part provides a brief overview on bank performance and the
measurement methods. The second part presents a descriptive analysis of bank gover-




The Concept of Banking Performance
In general, the performance is defined as the achievement of the objectives set forth by
the firm (the bank) within the agreed time and with minimal costs while using the
available resources.
For example, for a manager, the performance may be profitability or competitiveness
for the company or for the employee, the work environment, or the quality of services
rendered for the customer. The multiplicity of possible approaches brought out a
concept determined due to the diversity of groups that make up the organization.
Measurement of Bank Performance
The measure of performance is, as any function of control and management, a way to
guide the behavior of the actors of an organization and motivate them. There fare,
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improvement cannot take place unless there is a way to get feedback on performance,
because measure is the first step to improvement.
There are two basic types of measurement of bank performance. The first type is
related to the results (the second one financial measure) focuses on the determinants of
the results (nonfinancial measures) such as quality, flexibility, use of resources, and
innovation. This stipulates that, as part of performance, measurement can be established
around the concepts of outcomes and determinants.
In fact, we notice that there is an evolution of performancemodels on financialmeasures.
Therefore,manystudieshaveusedcriteriasuchasprofitabilityratios(returnonassets (ROA);
return on equity (ROE)) and cost-efficiency for measuring bank performance.
Profitability Ratios as a Measure of Bank Performance Several authors used the
ROA and ROE measurement to designate corporate financial performance.
Return on Assets This variable represents the rentability of funds employed and
expresses the ability of these funds to create a certain level of operational benefits.
This measurement has been used by a large number of authors like Adams and
Santos (2005) and Eisenberg et al. (1998).
The measurement, which will be kept throughout this study, for the calculation of
ROA is as follows:
ROA ¼ net income=total assets
Return on Equity This ratio is also called the financial profitability coefficient. It is
considered among the most financial indicators used to measure banking performance.
It shows the contribution of equity in the realization of the result. It measures, in some
way, the investor’s returns level, that is, the higher it is, the more the funds allocated are
more effectively used to achieve a positive result. Several authors have used, too, this
performance measure as Bouri and Bouaziz (2007).
The measure that holds to measure the ROE is as follows:
ROE ¼ net income=equity
Efficiency as a Measurement Tool of Bank Performance Johonsen and Scholes
(1997) define efficiency as an internal measurement of business performance; it is
frequently assessed in terms of cost, production, profit, or productivity, and it is
measured by the amount of resources used to produce a unit of goods or services.
In other words, efficiency is the ability to use the minimum possible of resources to
achieve a given level of efficiency. It measures the absence of waste in the use of
resources.
Thus, efficiency measures the productive performance of banks and not only their
financial performance.
However, effectiveness is the nature of what is effective. It is the ability to achieve
the desired or expected result to achieve the objective. Goals can be broken down into
one or more criteria: time, quantities, costs, quality, profitability, etc.
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Effectiveness is also the quality of a person performing a task effectively, which
achieved the objectives set for it. In business, effectiveness is one of the evaluation
criteria of an employee by his manager.
In their journals, microeconomic studies seeking to measure the efficiency of the
banking sector, Berger and Humphrey (1997) identify five main different techniques:
two nonparametric approaches, the method of data envelopment analysis (DEA) and
the free disposal hull (FDH), and three parametric approaches, namely the stochastic
frontier approach (SFA), the approach of free distribution (DFA), and the thick frontier
approach (TFA). Of these five techniques, those of stochastic frontier and data envel-
opment are mostly used. We will outline two approaches that are the method of DEA,
which is the mostly used.
*Data envelopment analysis (DEA) The first method of this group is a technique called
linear programming DEA. For this method, the efficient frontier is estimated by a convex
polyhedron enveloping all the observations, the most effective of which are on the border.
This linear programming was first introduced in the study of the efficiency described
in the work of Charnes et al. (1978) which is based on the work of Farrel (1957). Banker
et al. (1984) show that the measurement of efficiency, described in the work of Charnes et
al. (1978), can be divided into two components: technical efficiency and scale efficiency.
The method DEA has in recent years a great success through its use, especially after
the development and changes in the level of this technique by Seiford and Thrall (1990)
and Miller and Noulas (1996), and more recently by Alam (2001).
Presentation of the Tunisian Banking System
The Tunisian banking system currently has about 30 banks organized around the Central
BankofTunisia. It comprises four categories of banks: deposits, development, sales, andoff-
shore banks.
It can be concluded that the reforms introduced in 1986 guided the Tunisian
economy toward liberalization through deregulation and improved functioning of the
financial market.
Given the sensitivity of the sector in question and its key role in placing the heart of
any economic restructuring of the banking system has become a priority for Tunisian
economic and monetary authorities.
Banking Governance
However, to study the governance of banks in a relevant way, fake it back to their
characteristics. Indeed, banks are more opaque than other firms. The asymmetry of
information is everywhere. It affects the relations between the leaders and members of
the bank’s board. It also affects the relationships of internal and shareholders. There-
fore, banks are highly regulated as other firms.
The etymological meaning of the term Bgovernance^ is oriented on how quotas are
governed. The historical evolution of the term and its theoretical approaches led to a
proliferation of definitions and has concluded that the plurality and diversity of
meanings reflects the sensitivity of the concept of governance.
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It is noteworthy that thoughts currents have used the notion of governance with
different purposes, and it is possible to identify the common elements which refer to
different thoughts when using the term. In other words, this serves aims to clarify and
determine the characteristics and modalities of governance.
However, before addressing the governance mechanisms, it is important to rely on
the study of the movement of Bcorporate governance^ in Anglo-Saxon countries and in
France and try to distinguish the different system governance therein.
Corporate Governance Systems
For most theorists, there are two main models of governance: governance models,
which focus on the functioning of markets, and models that are based on strong
involvement of banks and limitation of market mechanisms. In addition, there are
systems that borrow median each of the two streams.
*Bank-oriented systems or Germano-Nippon Model
The governance system is said to be a network if the control is provided by a bank that
is both creditor and main shareholder of the company and also by the firm’s partners.
It was particularly Germany and Japan, which have favored the emergence of a
strong banking sector, through the concept of universal banking, which can help
companies finance them. This system also obeys internal mechanisms that provide
good preventive capacity and facilitate cooperation and long-term investment when
their healing ability is limited.
*Oriented systems markets or the Anglo-Saxon model
The system is said to be market if the control and regulation will operate through the
financial market through takeovers.
The Anglo-Saxon model encompasses the USA and Canada which presents gover-
nance similarities. It is characterized by dispersion of share ownership, separation of
ownership, and management and emphasis on financial markets.
*The French model or hybrid system
There are hybrid or median governance systems betweenmarket systems and network
systems. These are the Italian and French cases. This model is characterized by govern-
ment intervention to shape the governance system. Otherwise, the governance system is
said hybrid if the control operates both through market and financial institutions.
The Basic Theories of Governance
The concept of governance has evolved through the theoretical literature. Indeed, a
review of research, both theoretical and empirical, reveals the existence of two main
streams that offer different explanations of the effectiveness of organizations and their
existence. The first is related to contract and the second cognitive origin.
The Contractual Theories of Governance The shareholder approach
In this approach, the firm is seen as a nexus of contracts, to manage centrally all
contracts necessary for production. In this perspective, the role of the firm is reduced to
the resolution of conflicts of interest. Three theories are the essence of this contractual
power figure out: the theory of property rights (Alchian and Demestz 1972), the agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and the theory transaction costs (Williamson 1985).
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*The theory of property rights
Alchian and Demestz (1972) are the founders of this theory. Both founders consider
the firm as a nexus of contracts, and the leader’s mission is to define the nature of tasks
and to choose the people who must execute within the Bnexus^ cooperative.
*The agency theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976), founders of the agency theory, inspired by the ap-
proach of Alchian and Demsetz, define the firm as a nexus of contracts. The explan-
atory model of financing and ownership structures is based on information asymmetry
assumptions and conflicts of interest between the owner-manager, the new share-
holders, and financial creditors. For Jensen and Meckling (1976), Bthere is an agency
relationship when a person uses the services of another person in order to perform on
his behalf any stain.^
*The transaction cost theory
This theory was founded by Williamson (1985) that conceives the firm as an
alternative way of organizing parallel market transactions. It considers that the firm
exists to overcome market failures, problems related to asset specificity, and opportun-
ism potential actors. Based on the principle of efficiency, Williamson defines transac-
tion costs as Bthe costs of contractual trade in goods or services between companies.^
The theory of rooting
In the late 80s, the theory of rooting was developed by Morck et al. (1988). It
challenged the foundations of contractual theories in general and the theory of the
particular agency. This theory seems to provide an appropriate framework for analyzing
opportunistic strategies of the leaders and their consequences on the control systems
and on the company’s performance. Rooting is for leaders to value (themselves) their
presence within the company by making costly dismissal, and thus reducing their risk
of replacement.
The partnership approach
If the shareholder approach favoring the study of conflicts between managers and
shareholders, the recent evolution of contractual theories of the firm takes into account
all the stakeholders. The partnership approach has its roots in the representation of the
firm as a production team, in which value creation or organizational rents are due to
synergies among the different factors of production.
Such an approach, proposed by Charreaux and Desbrières (1997), supposes that the
relationship between the firm and the various stakeholders are not just shopping but are
constructed to create value. This approach leads to studying the system of governance
in its ability to create social value, equal to the difference between the sum of income
valued at price opportunity and those of opportunity costs for different factors of
production.
Cognitive Theories of Governance Contrary to contractual theories, which can be
interpreted as extensions of the neoclassical economic model, these theories (evolu-
tionary theory of the firm, theories of resources and skills, etc.) radically break with it.
Cognitive theories are based on a radically different view of the value creation
process to the extent that they lead to giving central importance to building skills and
capacity of firms to innovate, to create their investment opportunities, and change their
environment. The contractual theories, giving an exclusive almost interest to conflict of
interest, ownership of annuities, are silent productive dimension of value establishment.
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It is likely, however, that the main determinant of this creation lies not in the balancing
of interests (disciplinary perspective) but is in the cognitive dimensions of value
creation.
The firm also exceeds its disciplinary mission to take a more active way. In this
sense, Charreaux notes that, according to cognitive theory, the firm is treated simulta-
neously at a nexus of contracts and a set of specialized knowledge.
This cognitive dimension of governance should not lead, however, to overlook the
contractual approaches: the two dimensions are complementary and interlinked. Cog-
nitive theories focus more on the development of human capital through the process of
learning and innovation, while contractual approaches explain the dynamics of firm’s
governance system and its implications for the analysis of control problems and
incitement.
The Control Mechanisms and Resolution of Conflicts of Interest
The usual restraint typology distinguishes internal and external mechanisms of a firm.
The hierarchy of these different mechanisms is, however, not universal and may change
depending on the type of organization, and their contents may vary according to the
authors.
External Control Mechanisms and Bank Performance The market of goods and
services
The market of goods and services should encourage good management. It can be the
cause of perverse effects by encouraging leaders to assume a high level of risk in the
investment choices in order to obtain comparable profits of competitors. During this,
the discipline exerted by the market of goods and services is often inefficient. Indeed,
Jensen (1993) posits that Bwhen the market discipline of goods and services takes
decision, it is often too late to save the company.^
The legal and regulatory environment
The legal framework can be a means of control by requiring manager’s constraints
forcing them to make more cautions in spending on benefits of this kind. However, the
effectiveness of this mechanism seems limited. Indeed, leaders often find ways to
circumvent certain regulations.
The labor market
The labor market plays an important role in resolving the conflict between share-
holders and managers. This market is responsible for assessing the value of constant
managers. The goal of this model is to make a market wage revision executives so that
the process solves the incentive problems that can achieve endogenous processes in a
situation where there is separation of ownership and control.
The financial market
The financial market plays a crucial role in regulating the conflicts between the
shareholder and the officer since it allows sanctioning incompetence and opportunism
of the leaders who do not maximize the value of the firm.
This mechanism appears effective, even though without limits. Indeed, several
criticisms have been addressed to takeover market as a means of discipline leaders,
and some studies show that the profitability, productivity, and firms’ market share that
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undergone takeovers are often better than those of firms located in the same area and
that they remain independent.
Internal Mechanisms Bank’s governance is characterized by internal mechanisms
firms, the aim to influence and monitor the behavior of the leader. Indeed, the
effectiveness of internal system of bank’s governance through those of its main
elements the board and ownership structure in the control of management and protec-
tion of interests of the bank in line with those of its various partners.
Board of directors
In general, the board is considered one of the main instruments to address the
shortcomings of managers (Adjaoud et al. 2007). Thus, Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003) describe him as Bthe heart of governance.^
Several factors combine to have a good composition of the Board of Directors (the
presence of independent outside directors, duality, board size, the presence of special-
ized committees, etc.). The composition of the board was the subject of several studies
and debates. In an environment characterized by very rapid change, the challenge of
any board is to go beyond its traditional role and strengthen its oversight role. It is
therefore to improve board independence, composition, transparency, accountability to
shareholders and other stakeholders, and meeting frequency (Louizi 2007).
Indeed, the size of the board can also have an impact on risk-taking by the manager.
Adams and Mahran (2003) indicated that when the size of Board of Directors is high,
firms still have high performance levels associated with high levels of risk. They also
found that when it comes to a board whose size is reduced, its members can be easily
manipulated and influenced by the leader, while Jensen suggests a relatively small
board (comprising seven to eight members) to be more effective and can be controlled
by the executive.
The ownership structure
The concentration of ownership is considered an internal governance mechanism in
the governance literature. The ownership structure, whether owned by the family or the
state, plays a role in governance.
In the governance banking system, the ownership structure also acquires great
importance. Its effectiveness depends on the nature of shareholders, objectives, and
scope of their disciplinary actions.
Lang and So (2002) argue that the ownership structure has no impact on the
accounting performance and the shareholding of the state and that foreign investors
has a negative impact on the market performance of commercial banks.
The duality of the leader
The Bduality^ can be defined as the appointment of the same person over the same
period, the two positions of the Director General and the Chairman of the Board.
Regarding the banking sector, few studies have addressed the effect of duality on the
performance of banks. Pi and Timme (1993) find that efficiency and return on assets of
banks are lower as part of duality.
Indeed, the combined functions of the Chairman of the Board and the Director
General allows for increased knowledge of the activities and the bank’s environment.
The dual structure improves the competence and commitment of leaders to lead to
greater efficiency of banks. They would be motivated to develop a good reputation in
the labor market. Duality has significant costs that offset its potential benefits for most
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large firms. Indeed, the position of the president banks is extremely valuable to pursue a
strategy of rooting and to enjoy its privileges. Paquerot (1997) explains that, in addition
to full compensation, the position allows the officer to conclude more easily implicit
contracts with partners. It has to that effect direct control over the assets and can be used
to develop its human capital.
Relations Between the Internal Governance System Elements
It describes the board of directors and the ownership structure as an internal governance
mechanism. In what follows, we will focus on the various relationships between them.
In addition, with their various elements, they can accord the context of their
application to be a substitute or complement.
Empirical studies considering the relationship between internal governance
mechanisms, essentially the board of directors, ownership structure, and performance
are very limited in terms of emerging countries in the case of banks (Arun and Turner
2004).
Therefore, they substituted the relationships between the elements of the ownership
structure and those of the board. First, the shareholding by domestic administrators in
small size tips replaces the presence of external ones. Hirschey (1999) notes that the
increase in equity by internal library members implies a weakening of the need for
outside directors to control the executive.
In this respect, the strong internal managerial ownership reduces the probability of
having the dual management and control, by replacing the board. This is an empirical
result confirmed by some studies such as Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Bathala
and Rao (1995). Indeed, the board is often large when officers hold a significant share
of capital and when it has external members (Spong et al. 1999). The presence of the
latter is also substitutable for the concentration property. Thus, the actions taken by the
majority shareholders to control the leaders are so strong and influential that the use of
independent directors cost expensively. These actions also replace the revocation of
threat made by the council to encourage leaders to maintain good performance. Several
authors as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) confirm the substitution relation concentration
of ownership with the intensity of the control exercised by the board through its
independence, its size, and the separation of management functions of the General
and Chairman of the Board.
Nevertheless, in a bank characterized by the duality of its management, controlling
shareholders can reduce their shareholdings. In doing so, managers centralize decision-
making. Thus, there are alternative relationships between the presence of institutional
investors and disciplinary authority of the board. Indeed, these powerful granny
shareholders if they are not the majority tend to assume control of leaders. This reduces
the potential involvement of the board with other members in this regard.
Furthermore, improved governance can be achieved through the existing complementar-
ities between the internal mechanisms that work together to improve performance.
The ownership structure affects the composition of the board determined itself that
executive compensation. Thus, the percentage of outside directors increases the partic-
ipation of institutional investors and external capital. This is the assumption made by
shareholder vote Whidbee (1997).
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The Bank Governance
Ownership Structure and Bank Performance Shipments of the bank’s ownership
structure during the 1990 and the beginning of 2000 have significantly altered the
governance of banking institutions. Studies of US companies have typically used the
term Bgovernance^ to refer to the methods used by shareholders in order to reduce
managerial agency costs (Berger and Mester 2003). The governance studies that are
interested in countries other than the USA, particularly developing countries, have
often centralized on the role of the ownership structure in reducing these agency
problems due the weak legal infrastructure. In more, it is well known that all share-
holders adopt the goal of maximizing the value of the firm.
The ownership structure is an important governance mechanism because it is
adapted in order to take into account the connection between ownership struc-
ture and performance in the context of agency theory and the public choice.
The main problems/agent can occur when there is a separation between own-
ership and control.
Wide literature has focused on the relationship between governance and
performance banks (Bonin et al. 2005; Williams and Nguyen 2005). Some
assessed the static effects of different types of bank ownership structure, the
effects of long-term performance associated with a domestic property, foreign,
or public. On the other addressed the dynamic effects of changes in the
ownership structure of the bank, the effects of performance related to domestic
mergers and acquisitions, foreign acquisitions, or privatization. In some cases,
these studies have also examined the effects of selection of some banks that
have undergone dynamic changes in governance.
Impact of the Board on Banks Performance Added to the ownership structure
discussed in the previous paragraph, there are also other internal mechanisms that
influence bank performance: these mechanisms include mainly the board which,
through its size and composition, will have an impact on banking performance.
Impact on the size of the board on banks performance
According to the agency theory, the large size of the board promotes its domination
by the leader and eventually creates conflicts of interest between the directors and
managers. This creates a fragmented inefficient board, with difficulties to reach a
consensus on important decisions (Jensen 1993).
Some authors then conclude that board size is negatively related to the
performance of firms (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). However, several others
stressed the positive effect of a large size. For these latter, the added ability to
larger tips can be larger than the increase in communication problems, coordi-
nation, and decision-making.
Moreover, after studying 35 banks and bank holding companies in the USA
from 1986 to 1999, Adams and Mahran (2003) show that those banks with large
tips have higher performance than banks with small tip size. Furthermore, by
examining the relationship between the size of the board and performance, Belkhir
(2005) found, in contrast to theories that predict that smaller boards are more
efficient. Instead, he found a positive relationship between the size of the board
and bank performance.
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It is wise to check the results of these studies by the following hypothesis:
H1: The board size has a positive impact on bank performance; the larger the
size is, the larger performance will be.
Impact of independent members on banks performance
*Impact of foreign directors on banks performance
Studies concerned with the governance of banks by foreigners such as Claessens et
al. (2001) and Berger et al. (2000) often spot the differences in efficiency between
banks with high foreign ownership and those with strong local private ownership.
Indeed, the first banks, usually part of bank holding companies, benefit from economies
of scale that characterize these large organizations. They also have the advantage of
serving a customer base of multinational basis by moving to other countries mainly
those harboring foreign subsidiaries of their clients (local companies). Moreover, banks
with high foreign ownership have better access to capital markets, a greater ability to
diversify risk, and greater opportunities to offer some of their services to foreign clients
not easily accessible to local banks. In developing countries, foreign-owned banks from
developed countries also have access to new technologies primarily in information.
Bonin et al. (2005) argue that in developing countries, mainly those in transition (open
economy, etc.), all these benefits outweigh possible drawbacks due to disparities in
regulations and economic realities.
Besides, Oxelheim and Randy (2003) found that the impact of foreign direc-
tors on the performance of firms is positive. Their study covers more than 200
companies with seats in Sweden and Norway from 1996 to 1998; they argue
that the recruitment of a new foreign member to the board of a firm is perceived
by investors as a signal of transparency and willingness to improve governance.
What gives them more confidence in activism and independence of the
council and therefore increases the value of the firm. All these arguments allow
assuming that
H2: The higher the proportion of foreign directors is, the more performing banks
will be.
*Impact of representatives of the state and public institutions to the board on the
performance of banks
Based on the assertions of agency theory, state-owned banks would suffer lower
disciplinary effect from the financial market. This would encourage their leaders to
follow their own interests at the expense of the interests of their institutions. Managers
of private banks then suffer greater pressure of their environment and a more intense
disciplining effect of the financial market. This significantly reduces the efficiency of
these banks (Lang and So 2002). Similarly, La Porta et al. (2002) show that in all
countries, mainly developing, the shareholding of the state in commercial banks is a
common fact and a clear account of their inefficiencies. In fact, the most important
questions relate to the state ownership of banks concerning the availability of loans and
allocation of loan portfolio and especially efficiency. Such banks are experiencing a
low efficiency and suffer a high rate of nonperforming loans. These issues overwhelm
different goals of state-owned banks, which often engage in financing-specific sectors
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or regions, to provide direct export credits, operating in cooperation with other state
institutions, etc. Other studies have focused on the governance of banks in emerging
countries also stressed that the state or public institutions hold significant shares in their
capital. Their findings tend to predict the negative effects of this property and the
presence of representatives Bstate or government^ to advise on the performance of
banks. The following assumptions must be true:
H3: The higher the percentage of directors representing is, the less performing
banks will be.
H4: The higher the percentage of directors representing public institutions
increases, the less performing banks will be.
*Impact of the duality of management on banks performance
Duality means the appointment of the same person, over the same period,
the two positions the Director General and the Chairman of the Board. Duality
has significant costs that offset its potential benefits for most large firms.
Indeed, the position of the president banks is extremely valuable to pursue a
strategy of rooting and enjoy its privileges. Paquerot (1997) explains that in
addition to full compensation, the position allows the officer to conclude more
easily implicit contracts with partners. It has for this purpose a direct control
over the assets and can use to enhance its human capital. The president can
also increase its informational advantage on the board and strengthening of
employment security.
In addition, few studies have examined the effect of duality on the perfor-
mance of banks. Pi and Timme (1993) show that in the case of the manage-
ment of duality, efficiency and performance of the bank’s assets is lower. They
find in their investigation on big Americans commercial banks during the years
1988-1990, conflicts with the duality of principal / agent may be exacerbated
due to the consolidation of the monitoring process and the decision, which
negatively affect the bank’s performance. The contrary, the influence is positive
in the case of the separation between functions of decision and controls the
main conflict/agent does not seem to existing strengths.
So, duality can significantly increase the power of the executive in the bank’s
board in accordance with Gary and Gleason (1999). Their study focused on the
relationship between the probability of financial distress and bank governance
variables. They find that it is the only variable that has significant effects, namely
reduction of the probability of financial distress. The explanation lies in the fact
that the leader who is also the chairman always wants to protect his powerful
position and makes decisions that involve less risk.
By cons, Griffith and Fogelberg (2000) do not notice any impact of duality
on the performance of banks. They explain that the granting of an additional
title to the leader does not necessarily allow him to affect the bank’s perfor-
mance. It is rather the level of ownership that matters. They note in addition
that control done by the chairman of the board generally has a low impact on
the delivery of the General Manager.
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Finally, the duality can positively influence the performance under certain conditions
(high dynamic sector) and negative in other circumstances (munificence sector high).
This assumes that
H5: Duality has a negative impact on the bank performance.
The impact of governance on the bank performance
*Governance variables
•The variable of the leadership duality (DUAL)
Duality is defined as the appointment of the same person, over the same period, to
both posts of the Director General and the Chairman of the Board. According to Jensen
(1993), this variable has a negative effect on the value of the corporate market.
According to Mejdoub (2008), the separation of the functions of chairman and
the Director General reduces agency costs and improves performance.
Note also that another group of authors such as Daily and Dalton (1992) and
Brickley et al. (1997) confirm the absence of any effect envisaged accumulated
principal and manager functions Chairman of the Board on the value of the firm. On
the other hand, Pi and Timme (1993) show that with the duality, efficiency, and banks’
asset returns are lower and that the main conflict agent may be exacerbated due to the
consolidation of the monitoring process and decision.
• The variable of the board size (TAILC)
It is the total number of directors that serve on the board. According to the agency
theory, the board size is a source of conflict intensification between the managers and
administrators and of the leader’s dominance, which leads to a fragmented and
ineffective board.
The size of the board is also considered as a variable that can have a significant
effect on its efficiency (André and Schiehll 2004). The results of Yermack (1996) and
Bhagat and Black (2002) show the size of the board has a negative effect when the
board loses its effectiveness when it grows. Contrary to these results, those of Godard
(2001) show the absence of the effect of the size of the board on the performance of
French companies, regardless of the performance measures used. Adams and Mahran
(2003) state that banks that have a large board show a higher performance than those
whose board is reduced.
• The variable of the percentage of foreign directors (ADMETR)
This variable shows the percentage of foreign directors who serve on the board. It is
measured by the ratio of the number of foreign directors to the total number of
directors. According to Leightner and Lovell (1998), banks’ openness to foreign capital
in emerging countries improves their performance by granting them greater access to
technology and mainly to the best governance practices. Besides, Oxelheim and Randy
(2003) found that the impact of foreign directors on the firms’ performance is positive.
Indeed, banks with high foreign ownership have better access to capital markets, a
greater ability to diversify risk, and greater opportunities to offer some of their services
to foreign clients not easily accessible to local banks.
• The variable of the percentage of directors representing the government
This variable is measured as the ratio of the number of directors representing the
government to the total number of directors. Based on the hypotheses of the agency
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theory, state-owned banks would be subject to a less disciplinary effect by the financial
market. This would encourage their leaders to follow their own interests at the expense
of the interests of their institutions. Private banks are under intense pressure from their
environment; therefore, this can reduce the inefficiency of these banks. La Porta et al.
(2002) show that in countries, mainly developing, the state’s shareholding in commer-
cial banks is a common fact and because of their inefficiencies.
• The variable of the percentage of directors representing the public institutions
(ADMETAP)
This variable is measured as the ratio of the number of directors representing the
public institutions to the total number of directors. The several studies that focused on
the bank governance in emerging countries were carried out by Koh and Soon (2004)
who emphasized that public institutions hold large stakes in their capital. Their results
predict that this property and the presence of representatives on the boards have
negative effects on banking performance.
• The variable of the bank size (ACTIVE)
Thebanksize ismeasured intwoways,either throughthenatural logarithmofthebusiness
figureor the ratioofassets tosales.Thisvariable isalsousedbyGodard(2001)whofoundthat
the bank size has a positive and significant effect on profitability suggesting the existence of
economies of scale. Other authors such as Adams and Mahran (2003) also found that
performance ispositivelyassociatedwith thebank’ssize.Basedonthese results, it is assumed
in this study that the bank’s size positively influences its performance.
Regression Results and Discussions
The efficiency measurement of a bank’s ability to make the best use of its resources is
to achieve the best possible performance. Therefore, we will retain the economic
definition which refers to the ratio output/input.
The choice of a model Bpreferred^ to determine the extent of the banking efficiency
was not about agreement between the researchers saw that the actual level of bank
efficiency is unknown. However, the specific characteristics of the Tunisian banking
system can help to choose the most suitable technique with Tunisian commercial banks.
We will use the nonparametric approach outlined by Charnes et al. (1978) and more
precisely the wrap method data (DEA) that meets the requirements of our study in
terms of calculation of efficiencies in our sample scores.
Implementation of the DEA Tunisian Commercial Banks
The Model Specification and Variable Selection
Our empirical analysis deals with the calculation of the efficiency scores of Tunisian
commercial banks for the period between 2000 and 2011. The sample used consists of
eight deposit banks listed on the stock exchange, namely Amen Bank (AB), Arab
Tunisian Bank (ATB), Arab International Bank of Tunisia (BIAT), National Agricultural
Bank (BNA), Tunisian Bank (BT), Tunisian Banking Company (STB), International
Banking Union (UIB), and Housing Bank (BH).
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Other commercial banks have not been considered because of the lack of informa-
tion, and other categories of banks (development, sales, and off-shore) have not been
selected because of their different activities, their smaller numbers, and the lack of data
governance and clearer impact of external factors on them.
In addition, the retail bank group is the largest division in the financing of the
Tunisian economy. So, the selected sample can then give an idea about the effects of
governance on performance.
The financial data used are collected from the annual bank activity reports, annual
reports of the Tunisian Professional Association of Banks, and guides the Tunisian
stock exchange.
Measure Variables
The selection of inputs is challenging the power of the wrap method data (DEA) in the
discrimination between banks. Indeed, each resource used by the bank is included as an
input that will convert the resources to produce output.
The explanatory variables are the number of the staff, the capital, the total bank
assets, equity, and net income.
The explained variables are ROA, ROE, and efficiency.
Results
The DEA method is applied to calculate the efficiency scores reflecting the
good practice of the governance system. More specifically, the basic idea of the
DEA method is the determination of a frontier that represents the best practice:
the input that maximizes the output. The results reached after the application of
the DEA, regarding the constant returns to scale by the DEAP 2.1 software, are
shown in Table 1.
• Analyzing the efficiency score evolution per bank (2000–2011)
Table 1 shows the average technical efficiency of the Tunisian commercial banks
during the observation period (2000–2011) which is 99.3 %. This brings us to the
conclusion that technical inefficiency is 7 % (1 to −0993). An average overall level of
technical efficiency of 99.3 % means that the sample studied is very efficient. Actually,
an efficient bank has a combination of governance practices that will maximize
performance and therefore makes it possible to minimize the agency costs.
On examining the Fig. 1 entitled the distribution of the efficiency scores presented
above, we find that it means the nonefficiency of the bank structures. We can therefore
conclude that the efficiency scores are highly concentrated between 0.993 and 0.998.
From the Table 2 of the data descriptive analysis, we can see that
– Regarding governance variables, one notes that
& Fifty percent of the sample observations are banks where the president of the board
is at the same time the chief executive officer, whereas in the remaining 50 %, there
is a separation between the functions of manager and controller.
& The percentage of foreign directors on the board varies between 0 and 58 %, which































































































































































































































































































& The percentage of directors representing the government who serve on the board of
directors is about 12.4 % on average. However, this percentage varies between 0 and
72%.
& The proportion of directors representing public institutions observed in banks is
16.3 % on average. This share can reach 60 % in public banks but no remains in
private banks.
& The size of the board is between 7 and 12 with an average of 11.16 % of the directors.
– In terms of performance variables, one notes that
& ROA: The average value of this ratio for the sample banks is 0.9 % knowing that
oscillates between a maximum of 0.32 % and a minimum of 0 %.
& ROE: The average value of this ratio to average 9.4 % knowing that oscillates
between a maximum of 2.3 % and a minimum of 0 %.
The Correlation Between Governance and Performance of the Tunisian Commercial
Banks
Model Overview The regression model is the basis of econometrics. It consists of an
equation linking an endogenous variable (to be explained) to a single exogenous one
(predictor). It is written as follows:
Yit ¼ α0i þ α1iX1it þ α2iX2it þ…þ αkiXkit þ μit
where i is the banking index and t the time index.
Usually, a regression model involves three types of variables:
Xjit In our case, it is the performance explanatory variable which measures the
different forms of governance within a bank. The variables are DUAL, TAILC,
ADMETR, STATE, and ADMETAP LACTIF.
Yit It is a performance measure. In our case, it will be represented by the following







AB ATB BH BIAT BNA BT STB UIB
Distribution of the efficiency scores 
Fig. 1 Distribution of the efficiency scores
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μit This variable expresses the random effect on the dependent variable which
explains the other model factors that are made nonexplicit. It is the stochastic part
of the model which makes it operational. The values of ɛit, which are called
theoretical disturbances or errors, are unobservable. One can only characterize
them using a set of assumptions regarding their behavior.
Analysis of the Estimation Results Through the OLS Method Governance impact
on banking performance measured by the ROA
The panel structure is perfectly homogeneous.We can therefore apply the ordinary least
square method that allows a better adjustment which minimizes the sum of the residual
squares. The first model adopts the ROAperformancemeasure as the dependent variable.
The results of the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation are reported in Table 3.
ROAit ¼ α0 þ α1DUALit þ α2TAILCit þ α3ADMETRit þ α4ETATit
þ α5ADMETAPit þ α6LACTI Fit þ μit
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variables Average Maximum Minimum
Combine the functions of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors 0.5 1 0
Size of the board 11.167 12 7
Percentage of foreign directors 0.207 0.58 0
Percentage directors representing the STATE 0.124 0.72 0
Percentage directors representing public institutions 0.163 0.6 0
Log (actif): size 7.979 8.782 5.633
ROA 0.009 0.032 0
ROE 0.094 0.23 0
The descriptive study was carried out on 72 observations









The values in brackets are those of the t-statistics. R2 = 0.75; F-stat = 33.59 (0.00)**; DW= 0.68
*, **The coefficient is significant at the 5 and 1 %, respectively
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Based on this result, we can conclude that the variable representing duality has a
positive and significantly clear influence; therefore, H5 is rejected.
• Governance impact on banking performance measured by the ROE
The second model applies the ROE performance measure as a dependent variable.
The regression results are reported in Table 4.
ROEit ¼ α0 þ α1DUALit þ α2TAILCit þ α3ADMETRit þ α4ETATit
þ α5ADMETAPit þ α6LACTI Fit þ μit
From this table, duality seems to have a positive and statistically significant impact
on the return on equity.
• Impact of governance on banking performance measured by efficiency
The third model applies efficiency as a measure of performance. The EFF is a
dependent variable. The regression results are reported in Table 5.
Y it ¼ α0 þ α1DUALit þ α2TAILCit þ α3ADMETRit þ α4ETATit þ α5ADMETAPit
þ α6LACTI Fit þ μit
On the basis of the regression of governance variables on the Y variable that
measures the efficiency of banks, it can be noticed that all coefficients show that
there is total nonsignificance for all the variables. Neither the adjustment quality nor
Fisher’s statistic gives a leverage to accept this model. This result makes
us conclude that there is no relationship between the variables representing the
characteristics of the governance form within banks and the level of their efficien-
cies. Indeed, in the case of the Tunisian commercial banks, efficiency does not
depend on governance mechanisms.









R2 = 0.41; F-stat = 7.52 (0.00)**; DW=0.49
* indicate significance at the 5% levels
** indicates significant at the 1% level
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Analysis of the Estimation Results Using the Method of GLS
Autocorrelation is one of the most common problems in the econometric analysis which
concernsonly the timeseries.The resultsof this test reveal that there is aproblemofapositive
autocorrelation, the thing which brings us to apply the methods of generalized least squares
(GLS) to estimate themodel.
The result for the three models is summarized in Table 6.
Based on the facts set out above, it can be concluded that the ASSET variable
designating the bank size is the most significant variable with a negative sign for both
forms of bank profitability (ROA and ROE). This result is consistent with those of









R2 = 0.074; F-stat = 0.87 (0.00)**; DW=2.56
Table 6 Estimation results through the GLS method (governance/ROA, ROE, and EFF)
Variables Performance
ROA ROE EFF
C 0.0307** 1.0397 1.043393
DUAL 0.0165* 0.4609 −0.018403
TAILC −6.06E−05 0.0033 −0.001123
ADMETR −0.0012 −0.0233 −0.007786
ETAT −0.0075 0.3651 0.032186
ADMETAP −0.0346** −0.0274 0.003551
LACTIF −0.0022** −0.0192** −0.004192
AR(1) 0.8632** 0.9947** −0.212907
R2 0.903 0.848 0.115
F-stat 74.51 44.78** 1.04
DW 1.85 2.24 2.19
For the italic entries: We noticed an error autocorrelation problem signaled by a low value of the Durbin-
Watson for ROA and ROE in the result of the estimate by OLS. To correct this problem, made the
transformation of the original model by introducing the error term as AR (1) and then made the re-estimation
of the model by OLS. And the problem has been corrected to ROA and ROE
*, ** The t-statistics or Fisher are significant at the 5 and 1 %, respectively
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Boyd and Runkle (1993), Adams and Mahran (2003), and Godard (2001), who find the
bank size has a positive and significant impact on profitability suggesting the existence
of economies of scale. This result shows that the largest banks, in terms of total assets,
are the public banks, namely the STB, BNA, and BH, which are recognized to be less
efficient, in general.
Discussions
From the result in Table 3, it can be said the accumulated positions of the Director
General and the Chairman of the Board in the case of Tunisian banks contribute in a
remarkable way in performance (expressed in terms of economic profitability (ROA)).
This contradicts the results of Mejdoub (2008) which shows that the duality can
influence negatively on performance.
Next, the board size has a negative and insignificant impact; as a result, H1 is
rejected. Therefore, the nonsignificance of this variable is explained by the fact that the
size of board of the Tunisian banks is about the same. Actually, the number of directors
who serve on the boards of the Tunisian banks is close to the maximum allowed by the
law, that is, 12 members. This result is consistent with the results of Yermack (1996)
and Bhagat and Black (2002), which show that this effect is negative since the board
loses its effectiveness when it grows.
Similarly, foreign directors, who are individual outside members of the board with a
high experience and good reputation, are asked to enrich bank governance. Despite this,
the regression of their percentage on the ROA reveals a negative but no significant
impact; therefore, H2 is accepted. This can be explained by the fact that these individuals
generally ignore the Tunisian economic reality andmay have difficulties in implementing
their concepts of governance on the specific case of the Tunisian commercial banks.
The second and third significant variables in this model are ADMETAP and STATE.
Actually, the coefficients associated with these two variables are negative and signif-
icant. We can confirm the agency theory, that is, state-owned banks would be subject to
a lesser disciplinary effect from the financial market, which will drive their leaders to
follow their own interests at the expense of those of their institutions. However, private
banks would then be subject to more pressure from their environment and a more
intense disciplinary effect from the financial market. These results comply with those
generated by La Porta et al. (2002) who state that, in developing countries, the state
shareholding in commercial banks is a common fact and a clear cause of their
inefficiencies. Finally, the bank size is positively but not significantly correlated with
the ROA. As consequence, the larger the bank is, the weaker its performance will be.
However, we can notice that, despite the favorable (R2) quality adjustment and the (F-
stat) overall significance, the model faces a major error autocorrelation problem. In fact,
this problemmay challenge the results of the OLS estimation. It is therefore necessary to
correct this by adding an autocorrelation and AR (1) term to the previous regression.
This method is called GLS method, which will be applied in the following paragraph.
The result from Table 4 confirms the literature denouncing this form of leadership
for power abuse by the executive. Jensen (1983) state that this combination of features
raises the agency costs (impartiality of control, ambiguity of responsibilities, conflicts
of interest, imbalance power, information asymmetry, etc.) and weakens the board
effectiveness and therefore reduces performance.
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Next, the results reveal the existence of a significant negative correlation between the
board size and performance measured by the ROE. According to the results of Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003), the board size is negatively related to banking performance.
Moreover, we notice that the percentage of foreign directors and that of directors
representing public institutions have a negative and insignificant impact. However, the
presence of the state as a board member has a negative and significant impact. These
results may support the same interpretations mentioned above. Finally, the bank size
has positive but insignificant impact on its accounting performance measured by ROE.
We present the interpretations for Table 6 followed by built models regarding the
variable regression and governance as well as by variables of the performance measure-
ments of the Tunisian banks. First of all, regarding the governance variable regression on
the measurement variable of the ROA performance, we notice that the dual variable has
a positive and significant impact, which contradicts the results of Pi and Timme (1993).
This result can be explained by the fact that the practice regarding the same person acting
as both Chairman of the Board and the Director General board helps increase the
knowledge about the activities and the internal and external environment of the bank.
Next, the variables representing the proportion of foreign administrators, the state,
and the size of the board show a nonsignificant correlation. Finally, the variable size of
the bank and the percentage of the administrators representing the public institutions
have a negative and significant impact. Regarding the first variable, we can say that the
smaller the bank is, the better its performance will be. Boyd and Runkle (1993)
concluded the same thing by stating that due to the introduction of deposit insurance
systems, the leaders can engage in high-risk activities in order to raise their earnings
while increasing the bank’s size. However, the performance may decrease with the
increase of bad debts and potential losses. Regarding the second variable, we can say
that the presence of these directors is closely related to their institutions’ contribution to
the bank’s capital.
However, the results of the regression variables characterizing the bank governance
mode in the Tunisian commercial banks on the ROE show that all the variables have a
nonsignificant correlation excepting the bank’s size variable which has a negative and
statistically significant impact. The result of the bank’s size variable can support the
above interpretations.
Finally, the third model does not seem significant (R2 =0.115 1). In fact, no variable
is significant. This result is consistent with the one found in the OLS model estimation.
It can be concluded that these variables do not affect the bank efficiency.
Conclusion
The literature relating to the banking industry argues that the regulatory and institu-
tional factors such as regulation, quality of the environment, market structure, or market
discipline themselves as being key determinants of bank performance. These determi-
nants can be extended to other factors, namely bank governance. That is why we
looked at a database in order to provide evidence on the influence of this determinant of
the performance of Tunisian commercial banks. That is why we looked at a database in
order to provide evidence on the influence of this determinant of the performance of
Tunisian commercial banks.
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To do this, we used the following methodology of analyzing the effect of gover-
nance on bank performance by performing first, a presentation of the different banking
performance measures, namely the respective ratios ROA, ROE, and efficiency was
determined by applying a nonparametric method called DEA.
The goal of this method is to determine the banks’ efficiency scores during the study
period. In second place, we estimated the model parameters.
The analysis of the impact of bank governance performance on the entire sample, we
found that on one hand the size of the board, the presence of foreign directors, and the
size of the bank had an insignificant impact on the level of performance. Moreover, the
direction of duality, the presence of directors representing institutions, and state officials
tend to increase the performance measured by economic profitability (ROA).
There is no significant relative relationship between performance and representatives
of public institutions, foreign, duality management, and the bank’s size. However, this
relationship is significantly with the size of the board and representatives of the state.
Similarly, the correlation between the variable efficiency, as an internal measure of
bank performance, concluded the lack of a significant impact of governance variables.
It shows that the impact of governance on the performance of Tunisian commercial
banks present divergent results. This discrepancy is linked to several characteristics of
these banks other than their size, the size of their boards, the percentage of foreign
directors, representatives of state and public institutions, and the duality of their
directions and especially to other mechanisms in particular governance of the owner-
ship structure. This course much influenced the composition, but this relationship of
substitution and complementarities with the composition of the board in connection
with their respective influences on bank performance.
The study of the impact of mode of governance on market values and the accounting
performance of banks does not show unanimity in the conclusions. The impact of each
governance variable varies according to the measure of the selected performance.
Finally, note this study was done on only eight commercial banks. This limit was
imposed in part by the lack of data available for the other categories of banks.
Moreover, it is dictated by the fact that the banks in our sample used are the most
exposed to problems of governance that the presence of the relationship between
ownership and control that characterized them.
The majority of Tunisian bank component production base are indeed a midsize
banks and other hand are characterized by a high opacity. The establishment of an
alternative market can be an incentive to adopt a policy that favors greater transparency
and more generally to adopt good governance practices. Indeed, despite its compre-
hensiveness, the selected sample includes only eight banks. The sample narrowness
will certainly affect the validity of some of our results. The number of banks has been
retained in reality conditioned by data availability.
As for the variables, we limited ourselves to measurements of ratios ROA, ROE, and
efficiency as indicators of banking performance. We have reproduced in this sense, the
choice of existing variables in all of the most recent empirical studies of our research
topic. Obviously, taking into account other governance variables and performance
measurement such as the independence of directors and the presence of major share-
holders in the board may make other answers to the issues raised and can enlighten
advantage of the specificities of banking governance in Tunisia. It is, therefore, an
earlier search path.
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Another avenue of research can be raised. This is to study the impact of all
mechanisms of both internal and external efficiency of the bank.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
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